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Accountability will be an important part of the new development
agenda.”
Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary General, May 2014
1. Introduction
“Accountability” has taken the place of “political will” as a silver
bullet to improving maternal and newborn health (MNH) in Africa. Like
political will, it is a part of a larger construct or health systems thinking
that depends on structural, managerial, andﬁnancial, aswell as power in-
terests (among others) to transform the health sector to deliver better
quality of MNH care. Programmatic efforts to increase accountability for
MNH as presented in the literature are ﬁltered through a national lens
and can only be realized when efforts to measure accountability evolves
to include both local and global concepts of transformative change.nal Health, Swiss Tropical and
e 57, P.O. Box, CH-4002, Basel,
artin Hilber).
logy and Obstetrics. Published byPower holders and decision-makers in MNH are increasingly being
monitored and held to account through a variety of institutions and
processes [1] to meet the challenge of accelerating progress in MNH
through the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, since 2015,
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3, targets 3.1 and 3.2, with an
additional eight targets directly affecting the health and well-being
of pregnant women and newborns. As evidence has emerged that
maternal and newborn mortality rate reductions are largely not being
achieved in Sub-Saharan Africa, or being achieved inequitably, the
importance of accountability within health systems, and governance
in general, has become a rallying call [2]. Improving MNH quality of
care and outcomes is seen as dependent not only on commitments
and investments generally, but also increasingly on the strength of
accountability for investments in relevant, evidence-based strategies
[2]. Although there is a heightened attention to accountability for the
delivery of quality services [2,3], there is a lack of systematic study of
the various types of accountability in MNH, how they have been opera-
tionalized in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the effects of applying different
accountability mechanisms in a range of contexts. It has also been
argued that accountability as amechanism (rather than as anorganizing
principle) focuses on “superﬁcial demonstrations of accountability”
including answerability, enforcement, and sanctions between twoElsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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to individuals (providers and clients alike) and institutions—whether
supported by policy or not—that can shift power dynamics and create
true accountability in the delivery and use of MNH services [4].
For the purpose of this mapping, a conventional deﬁnition [5]
of accountability is used as reﬂected in the majority of articles
reviewed. UsingWorld Bank nomenclature, the formalized and insti-
tutionalized processes that can help to ensure answerability for
progress in MNH are deﬁned in this paper as accountability mecha-
nisms. Accountability mechanisms can be political, legal, social,
ﬁnancial, managerial, or professional; formal or informal; and vary
in strength depending on the reach of their recourse or sanction pro-
cesses. Accountability exists when “…an individual or body, and the
performance of tasks or functions by that individual or body, are sub-
ject to another’s oversight, direction or request that they provide
information or justiﬁcation for their actions” [6]. This requires both
answerability with regards to decisions made, and the possibility of
enforcement of sanctions or remedy should the power-holder not
fulﬁl its obligations. Accountability can be diagonal: when citizens
oversee government institutions’ actions by engaging in activities
such as policy-making, budgeting, and expenditure tracking; horizontal:
when public ofﬁcials’ actions are overseen by other government agencies;
or vertical: when public ofﬁcials are held accountable to citizens, for
instance through elections, free press, and an engaged civil society
[7]. Public shaming by civil society groups or the media, for example,
can also be an effective change agent if those being called to account
are dependent on having a positive public image to maintain their
power base or position.
Creating accountability to improveMNHoutcomes requires involve-
ment of a wide range of actors including civil society organizations
(CSOs), government, the health sector, the private sector, media, and
the donor community. Accountability mechanisms should be context-
speciﬁc and address health system as well as socioeconomic, political,
and cultural barriers to MNH across the continuum of care [8]. Account-
ability for MNH, it should be noted, is not inherently rights-based
and predicated on the paradigm shift in principles promoted by the
International Conference on Population and Development of 1994 and
its subsequent review processes and consensus statements of the inter-
national community. The context of the application of accountability for
improved MNH needs to be negotiated through a political process in
which ethics, rights, and functionality of the health system based on
shared principles is mutually agreed by all stakeholders in the system
for the changes requested to be transformative and sustainable [4].
The growing consensus that accountability can underpin progress was
reinforced in the third report of the independent Expert Review Group
of the Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s
and Children’s Health (CoIA) monitoring country progress on the
Secretary General’s Every Woman, Every Child Strategy. Its six recom-
mendations were to strengthen accountability through greater political
support to implement the global plan, “accelerate collective action,”
engage with civil society, establish results-based ﬁnancing, and use
human rights tomonitor progress through the establishment of a Global
Commission on Health and Human Rights of women and children [2].
While top down in nature, such global efforts to track and publicize
progress against country commitments, targets, and goals set interna-
tionally assume public pressure (and shaming) can yield change in the
delivery of health services through increased funding, political will,
and public support for progress made. “Soft” recourse mechanisms,
however, stand in stark contrast to the “hard” sanctions called for in
other ﬁelds such as climate change where the Montreal Protocol
imposed sanctions for noncompliance by States for the phasing-out
of ozone depleting substances [9]. Moreover, recourse efforts in MNH
remain, until recently in the newSDGs, one-sidedly focused on developing
country progress or recipients of aid rather than on the nature, content,
and structure of donors and UN organizations’ effectiveness in their aid
contributions.In this Evidence for Action (E4A) Accountability Series, accountabil-
ity mechanisms in MNH have been deﬁned and categorized according
to the Brinkerhoff 2001 health systems typology [9] used by WHO and
which puts forward three categories of mechanisms: performance,
ﬁnancial, and political/democratic accountability [10]. In many of the
mechanisms presented below there is a tension between accountability
for control (with a tendency for blame) and accountability for improve-
ment, which focuses on learning and incentives [10].
Performance accountability encompasses “public sectormanagement
reform, performancemeasurement and evaluation, and service delivery
improvement. Performance accountability refers to demonstrating and
accounting for performance in the light of agreed-upon performance
targets. Its focus is on services, outputs and results [10]. Based on this
broad health systems deﬁnition, the following MNH relevant mecha-
nisms are taken into account in this series: maternal and perinatal
death reviews; professional norms, standards and bodies; health facility
committees; and monitoring and evaluation.
Political/democratic accountability refers to “the relationship between
the state and the citizen, discussions of governance, increased citizen
participation, equity issues, transparency and openness, responsiveness,
and trust-building” [10].
The following MNH mechanisms are taken into account in this
series: (1) social accountability-related mechanisms, such as tracking
of government commitments in MNH, social audits and complaint
mechanisms, petitions, campaigns andprotests, andquality of services as-
sessments (scorecards) with community participation; and (2) human
rights, which has been increasingly used as a tool for the enforcement
in accountability mechanisms: the possibility to avoid the majority
of maternal and newborn deaths making it an evident human rights
issue [11,12].
Financial accountability deals with “compliance with laws, rules,
and regulations regarding ﬁnancial control and management” [10].
The E4A Series reviews the followingMNH accountability mechanisms:
(1) ﬁnancial/budget tracking; (2) performance-based ﬁnancing; and
(3) market dynamics.
This present article describes the types of MNH accountability
mechanisms implemented and evaluated in recent years in Sub-
Saharan Africa, with a focus on interventions and tools reported in peer-
reviewed literature. It provides a conceptual framework to the articles
that follow. The structured review sought to answer four research
questions: (1) what accountability mechanisms and tools have been put
into place to improve the delivery of maternal and newborn healthcare
services in Sub-Saharan Africa; (2) how are the accountability mecha-
nisms currently being applied; (3) how effective are these mechanisms;
and (4) what are the prospects of future accountability work for
improving MNH outcomes in the new 2030 Development Agenda.
2. Materials and methods
The structured mapping of studies focused both on quantitative and
qualitative studies ﬁltered by inclusion criteria. A further screening was
carried out to select the articles fulﬁlling a pre-set search criteria.
2.1. Inclusion criteria, search strategy, and screening
The review was limited to peer-reviewed papers published in
English, French, or Portuguese between 2006 and 2016 related to the
Sub-Saharan Africa region. Only articles that describe an intervention or
assess anMNHaccountabilitymechanismor a process used to strengthen
such amechanismwere included. The literature searchwas carried out on
February 5, 2016, across ﬁve academic data bases: PubMed, Science
Direct, Web of Science, IBSS, and JSTOR. The search terms included:
“accountability,” “maternal health,” “neonatal,” “newborn,” “quality of
care,” “human right,” “governance,” “scorecard,” “audit,” “Sub-Saharan
Africa.” Further exploration for additional relevant articles was done
through selected searches in Google scholar and relevant websites.
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The ﬁrst screening took into account titles and abstracts and the second
full text articles. Papers were then subdivided into categories of
accountability and grouped by approaches used. Thirty-eight papers
were included in total.
Although there were innumerable reports on tracking progress
on international development targets and commitments, primarily
to the MDGs, ranging from UN reports such as that of the Commission
on Information and Accountability (CoIA) for the Secretary General’s
Every Woman Every Child Global Strategy to nongovernmental efforts
such as those of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
(http://www.healthdata.org/), and the Countdown [13], only peer-
reviewed papers that described or assessed an MNH accountability
mechanism were included. Only one such article [14] was included in
this review: an article on the Essential Newborn Action Plan (ENAP).
Accountability through other global and regional tracking efforts be-
yond ENAP is addressed in detail in the paper by ten Hoope-Bender
et al. [15] published in this series.
2.2. Analysis
Synthesis of relevant papers included a description and assessment
of the accountability mechanisms being implemented in Sub-Saharan
Africa in recent years. Speciﬁcally we aimed to label the accountability
mechanisms used or promoted and their purposes. We also described
who was accountable to whom and the consequences for compliance/
noncompliance (i.e. what is the recourse mechanism). When possible,
we describe the feedback loop that supports improvements as a means
to strengthening the quality of the service delivered or change sought.
We also assessedwhether evidence and advocacy activities (as promoted
by the E4A approach) were used to strengthen the accountability
mechanism. We then analyzed whether the intervention was evaluated
for effect on MNH speciﬁcally. The analysis thus provides a structured
approach to assessing the evidence on how accountability is used to
improve health systems and MNH in particular in Sub-Saharan Africa
using the Brinkerhoff 2004 accountability framework deﬁnitions, catego-
rized as performance accountability, political/democratic accountability,
and ﬁnancial accountability (see Table 1).
3. Results
The search generated 758 papers, which following screening and
allocation to one of the three accountability categories and related
mechanisms, resulted in a total of 38 papers: 22 concerning performance
accountability, 10 concerning political/democratic accountability, and six
concerning ﬁnancial accountability.
3.1. Performance accountability
Twenty-two articles focused on performance accountability, with
a large majority discussing maternal and perinatal death reviews
(n=15). Onlyﬁve other articles focused onMNHprofessional organiza-
tions and their support for the establishment of norms and standards.
Two articles discussed the use of health facility committees to compare
the quality of services and facilities through scorecards. Table 1 provides
a full overview of the studies.
3.1.1. Maternal and perinatal death and surveillance reviews, audits, and
conﬁdential inquiries
The review identiﬁed 15 articles presenting ﬁndings on the use of
various aspects of maternal and perinatal death and surveillance re-
views (MDSRs) as a means to call providers, facility managers, and
health systems to account for the quality of MNH services provided.
TheMDSRmechanism,which includes systematic notiﬁcation ofmater-
nal deaths, at facility and community levels, followed bymaternal death
reviews (MDRs) and verbal autopsies, aims to reinforce actions to betaken to solution identiﬁed problems and accountability at all levels.
No articles reported on the full MDSR process. Eleven articles reported
on government-led efforts to scale up the use of MDRs and audits:
two in Tanzania [16,17], one in Botswana [18], and one in Nigeria [19]
report on the lack of functionality of the MDR system due to a lack
of clarity of processes (Tanzania) and ownership by hospital staff
(Tanzania and Botswana), and human resource challenges (Nigeria).
In Malawi, a 2008 article [20] discusses the quality improvements
gained from combining MDRs and conﬁdential inquiries in maternal
deaths (CEMD) while a subsequent study in 2013 [21] documents
how implementation of MDRs at community level helped to remove
referral barriers and improve the quality of care generally. In Ghana,
an article from 2009 [22] notes that the ﬂexible use of CEMD enhanced
the conduct of MDRs. This was followed by another study in 2011 [23]
that documented initially poor implementation rates of recommenda-
tions, when highlighted by social advocacy, led to institutionalization
of the audit process, and inspired local leaders and the health services
to improve referral. Three studies from South Africa [24–26] document-
ed the establishment of three national committees: one on CEMD,
another on perinatal mortality, and a third on child mortality. These
three processes oversee MDRs, the review or audit, present recommen-
dations and strategies, and then monitor follow-up. Sustainability is
assured by the government.
Project-based support for MDRs and audits was documented in two
time intervals by Dumont et al. [27] in Senegal. In 2006, support for
the District maternity to conduct the process over time resulted in
improvements in the organization of care with a marked effect on
lifesaving interventions [27]. In the subsequent study in 2009, support
for facilities and administrators extended to providers. While most
health professionals were receptive of the process, some felt the process
“destabilizing and even threatening” [28].
Two articles reported on community engagement in MDRs and audits
to detectmaternal deaths in real-time and uncovered clinical and social
factors contributing to mortality, adding another layer of accountability
by local stakeholders for the quality of care received (or not received). A
routine community-level surveillance system by community health
workers supported by mobile health (mHealth) technology in Senegal
identiﬁed barriers and inefﬁciencies in hospital care and sped up the
data collection, review, and action cycle for greater accountability and
improvement in the quality of care [29]. A community-linked maternal
death review process in Malawi involving community verbal autopsy,
community and facility review meetings [30], and, in Mali and Senegal
[31], community and facility reviews, were implemented with external
support; both report improvements in the quality of care.3.1.2. Professional organizations
In total, ﬁve articles discussed the role of professional associations in
increasing accountability for the quality of MNH care, of which only one
[32] used regulatory mechanisms such as professional norms and
standards to call providers to account for the quality of the services
they provide in MNH. A FIGO-supported initiative in Uganda aimed to
build the capacity of professional organizations to inﬂuence policy to
improve MNH services [33]. The same FIGO-supported initiative was
also carried out in Cameroon [34] and Ethiopia [35], where facility qual-
ity improvements were also reported. The Society of Obstetricians and
Gynaecologists of Canada’s (SOGC’s) ALARM program also provided
technical training and support for implementation in Mali and Senegal
in partnership with the national obstetric and gynecology societies that
improved the quality of care at admission and postpartum monitoring
[31]. In Kenya, the professional society used professional norms to
improve the quality of MNH care through a normative re-educative
intervention to reset norms and values concerning good practice and pro-
moted “grass-roots” participation to improve delivery of quality MNH
care. Through this strategy they created “a soft contract” with senior
managers clarifying roles and expectations around desired performance
Table 1
Accountability mechanisms, deﬁnitions, and selected articles from Sub-Saharan Africa.
Type Accountability mechanisms Deﬁnition Approaches Articles/reference number Location
Performance accountability Maternal and perinatal death and
surveillance reviews, audits and
conﬁdential enquiries of maternal
death
Facility-based maternal death and surveillance review (MDSR) including maternal
death reviews (MDRs), audits, and conﬁdential enquiry of maternal death (CEMD) (at
national level) usually supported by health managers at district, region/province, and
national level, aim to identify avoidable factors and opportunities for improvement
through a conﬁdential multidisciplinary team discussion with contributions from staff
involved in the patient’s care and a review of the patient documentation (Beyond the
Numbers, WHO 2004).
National MDSR and
CEMD (n=11)
Nyamtema et al. 2010 [16] Tanzania
Armstrong et al. 2014 [17]
Mogobe et al. 2007 [18] Botswana
Kongnyuy et al. 2008 [20] Malawi
Vink et al. 2013 [21]
Hussein et al. 2009 [22] Ghana
Issah et al. 2011 [23]
Hofman & Mohammed 2014
[19]
Nigeria
SA Every Death Counts Writing
Group 2008 [24]
South Africa (SA)
Rhoda et al. 2014 [25]
Belizán et al. 2011 [26]
Project-based maternal death reviews and audits support a district or facility to
conduct the process for a period of time with external support.
Project-based MDR and
audits (n=2)
Dumont et al. 2006 [27] Senegal
Dumont et al. 2009 [28]
Community engagement in MDRs can support maternal death notiﬁcations and
uncover clinical and socioeconomic factors contributing to mortality.
Community-based MDR
(n=2)
Bayley et al. 2015 [30] Malawi
Moshabela et al. 2015 [29] Senegal
Professional organizations FIGO and national maternal and newborn-related professional societies
strengthen performance accountability by developing clinical training programs,
and by engaging with civil society and government for increased support,
recognition, and resource allocation for MNH.
Capacity building and
advocacy (n=4)
De Brouwere et al. 2014 [34] Cameroon
Beyeza-Kashesya et al. 2014
[33]
Uganda
Gebrehiwot et al. 2014 [35] Ethiopia
Pirkle et al. 2013 [31] Mali, Senegal
Performance accountability by strengthening norms and standards in clinical
practice and by creating a culture of “good practice” among professionals.
Normative mechanisms
(n=1)
English et al. 2011 [32] Kenya
Assessment tools or scorecards Performance can also be strengthened through regular facility assessments that
involve a multistakeholder team using set criteria, which are then translated into a
scorecard per facility for making comparison and healthy competition or
“benchmarking” between facilities. Clinical outcome data can also be used for
comparison between facilities and presented in popular formats for clients and
providers.
Assessment tools
including scorecards to
monitor progress (n=2)
Yilla et al. 2014 [37] Sierra Leone
Crofts et al. 2014 [36] Zimbabwe
Political and democratic
accountability
Social accountability Democratic accountability is attained through civil society campaigns that aim to
increase political and social pressure for improvements in MNH; This can be attained
through the engagement of community members within formal service delivery and
quality improvement systems.
Community engagement
and CSO advocacy (n=3)
Ray et al. 2012 [38] SA, Botswana,
Kenya Uganda
Mafuta et al. 2015 [39] Democratic
Republic of Congo
(DRC)
O’Meara et al. 2011 [40] Kenya
Nationally established commissions/platforms provide accountability to citizens
on the enforcement of laws, polices, strategies, or commitments to rule on abuse,
and track progress on MNH commitments and action plans. While not legally
binding, they provide social and political impetus for action by ministries of
health, ﬁnance, and others.
National Accountability
Mechanisms (n=2)
Center for Reproductive Rights;
Federation of Women Lawyers,
2007 [41]
Kenya
Garba et al.2014 [42] Nigeria
348
A
.M
artin
H
ilber
etal./InternationalJournalofG
ynecology
and
O
bstetrics
135
(2016)
345–357
Political accountability The UN and other international development partners (including journals such as
the Lancet) monitor progress toward attainment of the MDGs and now the SDGs
and their implementation. Recently, renewed commitments to saving newborn
lives and preventing stillbirths have been made by many governments and
partners in response to the UN Secretary-General’s Global Strategy for Women’s
and Children’s Health and its accompanying Every Woman Every Child initiative,
committing to recommendations made by the Commission on Information and
Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health. Relevant action plans have
been developed including the Every Newborn Action Plan and endorsed by
stakeholders to increase national efforts for newborn survival.
Country progress and
national level
monitoring n=(1)
Kinny et al. 2015 [14] Global (including
regional
Sub-Saharan Africa
(SSA) data)
Human Rights The international human rights system through its Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
requires signatory States to report on progress made toward ensuring improvements
in MNH care (under their obligations to respect, protect, and fulﬁll the rights to
health). In Africa, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is supported by the
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. As in the UPR, national
governments are to report periodically to the African Commission offering a regional
human rights accountability platform.
United Nations Human
Rights System (n=1)
Balogun and Durojaye, 2011 [43] SSA
National advocacy campaigns and social movements engage with the national
legal systems to hold their government to account.
National legal recourse
mechanisms (n=1)
Jones, 2005 [46] South Africa
Project and tools with a human rights-based approach have been developed to
operationalize State obligations (based on the treaties and conventions they have
ratiﬁed) to respect, protect, and fulﬁll their human rights requirements related to
maternal and newborn health. A human rights-based approach is a conceptual
framework that is normatively based on international human rights standards
and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights.
Human Rights Based
Approach (n=2)
Mhango et al. 2013 [47] Malawi
Cottingham et al. 2010 [11] Mozambique
Financial accountability Financial and budget tracking
schemes
Tracking of ofﬁcial development assistance for MNCH is carried out to promote
accountability among donors, in line with the Abuja and Paris agreements by
donors. This is done in conjunction with national governments.
Global tracking (n=1) Powell-Jackson et al. 2006 [48] SSA and global
Tracking of budget allocations and expenditures is carried out through
monitoring of national health subaccounts, and speciﬁcally RMNCH subaccounts
to facilitate ministries and civil society to track promised budget allocations and
expenditures.
National health
subaccounts (n=2)
Sidze et al. 2013 [49] Kenya
Mbeeli et al. 2011 [50] Namibia
Performance-based payment
schemes
Performance Based Financing (PBF) is a results-oriented approach that
incentivizes providers based on their achievement of agreed-upon, measurable
performance targets.
Performance based
ﬁnancing (health worker
level) (n=2)
Basinga et al. 2011 [51] Rwanda
Sipsma et al. 2012 [67] Rwanda
Demand-side ﬁnancing through consumer-led (vouchers, cash transfers, tax
rebates) or provider-led (capitation payment, referral vouchers) approaches
incentivize utilization of services and or efﬁciency in service delivery through
competition
Vouchers (n=1) Bellows et al. 2013 [52] Kenya, Uganda and
Sierra Leone
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allocation [32].
3.1.3. Scorecards and assessments to monitor progress through health
facility committees
Two articles reported on the use of health facility data made
available through scorecards and other visual formats to improve the
quality of MNH care by engaging health facility committees, providers,
and communities. Adaptation and implementation of local maternity
dashboards in a Zimbabwean hospital helped to drive clinical improve-
ment [36], while in Sierra Leone, data from facility assessments moni-
toring implementation of the Sierra Leone Free Health Care Initiative
of 2010 presented as facility scorecards contributed to facility-level
improvements for MNH [37].
3.2. Political and democratic accountability
A total of 10 papers were found that documented social or political
accountability mechanisms related to MNH: 3 articles focused on
community engagement and CSO advocacy; 2 on the use of national
laws and policies; 1 on monitoring of country level progress against
international targets; and 4 on the use of Human Rights instruments
to inﬂuence governments to act on their commitments.
3.2.1. Social accountability
In total, ﬁve articles discussed social accountability mechanisms in
MNH: three focused on engagement of civil society including clients,
professional associations, political activists in their call for social and
political accountability from government ministries on their public
commitments; and two demonstrated the use of laws, policies, and
regulations as national accountability mechanisms [38–42].
Three articles report on community and CSO engagement in social
accountability efforts to improve MNH. One article reported on how
partnerships between CSOs and professional associations in advocacy
to strengthen health systems were used in four country contexts
(South Africa, Botswana, Kenya, and Uganda) to reduce maternal mor-
tality. Using the successful South African Treatment Action Campaign
model (http://www.tac.org.za/), these civil society partnerships used a
complement of social accountability mechanisms such as the use of
CEMD, shadow reports to UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies,
and litigation to put pressure on the government to act on recommen-
dations received from the international human rights committees [38].
Two articles presented the role of communities in improving the
quality of services and accountability of health providers and local
government. In Kenya, community participation through health facility
committees created a formal level of engagement in district level plan-
ning placing them in a better position to ask for accountability or rather
answerability from decision-makers at district level [40], while in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) [39] community participation in
local government processes to improve MNH services was facilitated
but done so in an ad hocmanner. In both cases, the lack of deﬁned insti-
tutional accountability processes in case of noncompliance (e.g. by the
health center and managers at district level) limited the opportunity
to voice discontent. Neither paper mentioned the use of advocacy-
related activities to strengthen the accountability mechanism. The
need for evidence in strengthening the accountability mechanism is
mentioned; in the DRC, community members were not given access to
data on MNH services, however in Kenya, community members
produced data on their local health issues and priorities.
Social accountability through national-level social accountability
mechanisms supported by laws, policies, or regulations was reported
in two articles. In Nigeria, an Independent Accountability Mechanism
(NIAM) run by an independent civil-society led Expert Review Group
(iERG) was established to track MNH commitments and actions plans.
NIAM members that include elected representatives from civil society,
media, and health professional bodies demanded accountability fromthe central government and monitored actions resulting from their
demands. As yet, it is unclear what recourse mechanism exists in case
of noncompliance; however, the use of evidence and advocacy to
strengthen the accountability mechanism is well supported [42]. In
Kenya, with the support of international and national human rights
organizations, advocacy around poor quality of care succeeded in getting
the government to remove user fees for maternity services in all public
health institutions and secure the appointment of a new head of the
maternity hospital by someone experienced in a reproductive rights
approach to maternal health. This project was innovative in that
the midwives’ association, together with human rights organizations
provided rights-based training to service delivery, and secured support
from the ofﬁce of the Director of Public Prosecutions to help prosecute
cases involving abuse in MNH services. In response to the report by
the groups, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights began a
Public National Inquiry on Sexual and Reproductive Health in June
2011 involving country-wide public hearings, testimonials, and expert
forums [41]. None of the three papers presented mechanisms that
were assessed for MNH-related impact.
3.2.2. Political accountability: country progress andnational-levelmonitoring
One paper discussed political accountability mechanisms in MNH
[14] and focused on country progress toward implementing the
UN Every Newborn Action Plan (ENAP) initiative, including many
Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Launched in 2014, ENAP aimed to
achieve equitable coverage of high-quality care for all women and
newborns through links with other global and national plans and
measurement and accountability frameworks [14]. Although ENAP
was endorsed by World Health Assembly resolution WHA 67.19,
which recommended countries implement, monitor, and report on
commitments, there is no mention of who can demand accountability,
where answerability lies for country progress, and which recourse
mechanisms exist at country, regional, and international level. Such
global action plans and their tracking stimulate political accountability,
but there is no documented recourse mechanism for inaction or related
impact on MNH.
3.2.3. Human rights
Human rights as an accountability mechanism includes the use of
human rights commitments (through ratiﬁcation of human rights
treaties and conventions) as a tool of enforcement to respect, protect,
and fulﬁl legal obligations related to MNH. While there were many
articles that discussed human rights-based approaches to MNH, only
four provided clear examples of the use of human rights as a means
for accountability for MNH care in Sub-Saharan Africa. One article pro-
vided a review of how the UN Human Rights System was used to call
State actors to account for maternal, child, and newborn health in the
region. One article [43], reviewed the work of the African Commission
for Human Rights and the implementation of the African Women’s
Protocol, which speciﬁcally outlines the Right toHealth ofWomen related
to pregnancy and childbirth. It noted that unlike in Latin America, where
there was a case where the CEDAW committee ruled that the failure of a
State to provide emergency obstetric care for a pregnantwoman amounts
to violations of the rights [44], the African Commission and theWomen’s
protocol is “not yet fully implemented due to lack of State recognition and
enforcement of Human Rights standards in the region.”
Another article also used national legal recourse mechanisms to
enforce State human rights obligations enshrined in the constitution
to access to lifesaving medication for prevention of mother-to-child
transmission of HIV. The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in South
Africa won a legal suit in the constitutional court to expand access to
nevirapine despite regulatory and ﬁnancial barriers cited by the govern-
ment. The court stated that it is the obligation of the State “to devise and
implement a more comprehensive policy that will give access to health
care services to HIV-positive mothers and their newborn children, and
include the administration of nevirapine where that is appropriate.
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providing reasonable measures within available resources for the pro-
gressive realization of the rights of suchwomen and newborn children”
[45,p. 68]. The TAC approach, however, uses social litigation as a key tool
in its social and political campaign work through its mass base to take
aim at the formal political channels available in South Africa [46].
Two papers used WHO Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) as a
process to review national laws and policies related to MNH: one for
Community Based Integrated Management of Childhood Illness
(CB-IMCI) in Malawi [47], and the other in Mozambique [11]. In both
cases, WHO facilitated use of the process by multisectoral government
workers to reviewpolicy, and in the case of the CB-IMCIwith other part-
ners begin a community discussion to develop a human rights-based
approach to policy, planning, and implementation. While the use of
such processes has no formal recourse mechanism, they did achieve
changes in policy, and approaches by the Ministry of Health. In
Mozambique, the review identiﬁed critical barriers and informed the
development of the integrated maternal, neonatal, and child health
package of care. In Malawi, use of the CB-IMCI process pushed the
government to systematically include an HRBA in policy-making by in-
cluding rights in their MCH and child survival strategic plans and strate-
gies since 2005/2006, when the IMCI strategy was introduced.
3.3. Financial accountability
Six papers reported on the use of ﬁnancial mechanisms for account-
ability usually as a safeguard against inefﬁciency, misuse of funds, and
corruption to secure quality MNH services.
3.3.1. Financial and budget tracking mechanisms
Three articles dealt with ﬁnancial and budget tracking mechanisms
including the allocation of resources between 2006 and 2014 [48–50].
One article reported on global tracking of ofﬁcial development assis-
tance for MNCH to promote accountability among donors [48]. Two ar-
ticles focused on national health subaccounts and resource allocation by
governments and donors and expenditures in Kenya [49] and Namibia
[50]. The need for (aggregated) data of higher quality in Kenya was
reported [49], whereas the request to examine critically the efﬁciency
in the allocation and use of reproductive health expenditureswas raised
in Namibia [50]. One article recommended the inclusion of NGOs and
development partners into national health account teams [49]. All
three papers were limited to recommendations and did not provide
information on the recourse effect related to accountability.
3.3.2. Performance-based payment schemes
Two papers focused on performance-based ﬁnancing related to
MNH between 2011 and 2013. Two articles from Rwanda measured
the effect of performance-based payment for healthcare workers on
the quality of care [23] and the effect on the use of MCH services [51].
The two studies presented opposite results on whether the outcome
of the studies led to greater accountability. One study focused onmater-
nal health voucher programs in 28 countries including Kenya, Uganda,
and Sierra Leone [52]. They found commonalities in the design of such
programs and that such modalities can serve as a demand creation
instrument as they contain an inherent accountability mechanism in
that the voucher is the “payment” for the desired action. It is unclear
whether vouchers contribute to greater accountability in the system
beyond the set desired outcome however.
4. Discussion
Global, regional, and national efforts that call for greater accountabil-
ity from governments, health managers, and providers for the delivery
of quality MNH services are increasingly promoted (as shown in this
review), yet the coverage remains low and their effect to date has
beenmixed with few approaches able to document sustainable change.Progress has been most pronounced where recourse or punitive mea-
sures support enforcement of rules, regulations, norms or practice, and
is made public through social and political advocacy. Multistakeholder
andmulti-tactic approaches that target not only speciﬁc problems (i.e. ac-
cess to treatment) but also the underling norms around inequality in ac-
cess to care (as done in South Africa by the Treatment Action Campaign)
have had the greatest impact. Government-established national commis-
sions to review all MNCH deaths, supported by national advocacy cam-
paigns and social accountability processes, and reinforced by litigation
are a strong example of effective accountability in practice in the region
[24–26,46]. Acting across several sectors, as South Africa demonstrated,
was also effective in Botswana, Kenya, and Uganda [38] where activists
and media enhanced their capacity to act by building awareness around
the results of conﬁdential enquiries and the recommendations of the
Human Rights Treaty Monitoring Bodies.
Multi-actor and multi-tactic approaches, however, are few. Table 2
summarizes the facilitators and barriers to implementation of speciﬁc
recoursemechanisms. Themost common approach is the use of various
approaches to maternal and perinatal death surveillance as an account-
ability intervention to monitor performance of providers and facilities.
MDSRs are increasingly regarded as “best practice” to address provider
and health system weakness or failure, yet as shown in this review and
others, effective coverage is low without substantial project-related
support and mentoring for the intervention [53]. Successful implemen-
tation depends upon government leadership, engagement of district
managers and providers, ﬂexibility in approach to implementation,
and critically the institutionalization of the process to create collective
ownership and response. Making maternal death notiﬁable by law
adds to accountability. Weakness of existing systems and resource
constraints limit institutional ownership. The onus then falls on individual
seniormanagers or providers,which limits the level of support for follow-
up, and potentially focuses problems on individuals rather than the
broader context of organization and delivery of care.
Accountability through standard regulatory mechanisms as tradi-
tionally done by professional organizations in low-resource countries
also facilitates the implementation of MDSRs, CEMD, and audits.
Medical misconduct, for example, when regulated, monitored, and con-
trolled through disciplinary action is perhaps one of themost developed
examples of accountability for quality services despite WHO’s Beyond
the Numbers guidance that advocates “no name, no blame,” which
assumes that mismanagement is a team issue to be solved while main-
taining anonymous processes [54,55]. Monitoring of performance and
answerability through MDSRs, professional standards, and health sys-
tem oversight by government are key factors that reduced maternal
mortality in recent years, as in the case of Sri Lanka [56] and Rwanda
[57]. High-resource country professional associations are playing an
important role in supporting the development of societies in lower
resourced countries through project partnership, training, advocacy,
and external supportive supervision. Efforts such as FIGO’s Leadership
in Obstetrics and Gynecology for Impact and Change (LOGIC) initiative
in MNH and SOGC’s ALARM program have been effective in improving
quality of care, raising awareness, and gaining media attention to
MNH but are limited by project resources that cannot be sustained
over time. For professional societies to play a leading role, they need
to partner with government to better regulate and motivate providers
to improve the quality of care they deliver.
Performance monitoring through nonbinding assessments on the
status of facilities and services presented as scorecards, or other visual
formats [58], supported by a participatory, multistakeholder process
can provide the information and evidence needed for managers and
providers to make evidence-based decisions to improve the quality of
MNH care. Data alone, however, may not be sufﬁcient if not transparent
or of sufﬁcient quality. In addition, such approaches are often fragile as
the answerability for poor performance is either unclear or unenforced.
Social and political accountabilitywasmost effectivewhen advocacy
increased in support of other more binding mechanisms such as
Table 2
Recourse mechanisms, facilitators, and barriers to MNH accountability found within selected articles.
Type Accountability mechanism
and approaches
Recourse mechanisma Facilitators to effective accountability Barriers to effective accountability
Performance
accountability
Maternal and perinatal death
and surveillance reviews
including audits, and
conﬁdential enquiries of
maternal death.
• National MDR and Conﬁdential
Inquiries
• Project-based MDR and audits
• Community-based MDR
• Health system managerial professional
disciplinary action (++)
• Legal redress for medical malpractice
(++)
• Negative publicity and threat of legal
action (+)
• Community support and or discontent
and social reprisal for non-action (-)
• Government leadership and ownership strengthens accountability
within the health sector and assures sustainability [24–26].
• Engagement of district hospitals improves organization and quality of
care [27].
• Flexible use of Conﬁdential Enquiries of Maternal Deaths encourages
use and conduct of MDRs including CEMD and audits [22].
• Combining MDRs and criteria-based audit improves quality and
utilization (but not availability) of EmONC [20].
• Institutionalizing audits supported by communities (through
advocacy) strengthens collective ownership, responsibility (for
referral, removal or transport and other social barriers) and quality
of care [5,7,9].
• National review of MDRs can make maternal death notiﬁable by law
[18].
• Community involvement in MDRs and audits can detect maternal
deaths quickly and uncover clinical and social factors contributing to
mortality [30].
• Routine community-level surveillance system (supported by Mobile
Health technology) and MDR with verbal autopsy, community and
facility review meetings improves reporting, and more corrective
action is taken especially when done with community feedback
meetings to maintain interest and support [29,30].
• Poorly functioning systems within a weak health system limits
effectiveness [16–18,23].
• Poorly functioning facility-based committees create lack of
ownership focused on individuals rather than cadres of health
workers [18].
• Facility-based MDRs are often undermined by human resource
challenges [19].
• Problems identiﬁed by MDRs and CEMDs are not followed up
demotivating staff to maintain a functioning system [17].
• Health professionals and service administrators feel threatened
by the process [28].
Professional organizations
• Capacity building and advocacy
• Normative mechanisms
• Professional ethics creates pressure for
improvement in quality of care (+)
• Health system managerial professional
disciplinary action (++)
• Professional association partnerships (between associations from
more developed and less developed countries) strengthen the de-
veloping country associations to play a larger role to oversee and
improve the quality of care of their providers [33–35].
• Professional organizations provide training and advocacy to
update norms and standards and create a culture of “good
practice” among professionals [32,35].
• External supportive supervision can create an agreement or soft
contract with senior managers clariﬁes roles, expectations,
leadership, accountability, and resource allocation to enhance
workers’ commitment, capacity, and improved clinical care [32].
• Following guideline development, no follow-up is done due to
lack of resources and motivation by hospital teams [34].
Assessment Tools
• Assessments of scorecards to
monitor progress
• Health facility assessments
• Health system managerial professional
corrective action (+)
• Professional ethics creates normative
pressure for improvement in quality of
care (+)
• Community support and or discontent
and social reprisal for non-action (-)
• Negative publicity for non-performing
facilities (-)
• Use of Assessments or scorecards to create a participatory,
multistakeholder platform to monitor progress at facility level
[36,37].
• Assessments of scorecards provide information to evaluate and act
on facility readiness to improve quality of care, and facilitate
informed, decision-making [36,37].
• Implementation of maternity assessment called “dashboards”
with clinical outcome data using common computer software
supports rapid identiﬁcation of adverse trends and suggestions for
actions to improve healthcare quality [36].
• Presentation of scorecards evidence for providers in visually
engaging formats increases decision-making for facility based
improvements [37].
• Scorecards facilitate communication, strengthen coordination, and
create healthy competition among facilities, communities, and
district level authorities [37].
• Transparency of data on the status of services and facilities can
result in frustration and be demotivating if no action is taken
for improvement [36].
• Sustaining momentum if no further training, resources, or
supportive supervision is provided following poor results can
be an issue [37].
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Political and
democratic
accountability
Social accountability
• Community engagement and
Civil Society advocacy
• National Accountability
Mechanisms
• Community support and/or discontent
and social reprisal for non-action (-)
• Negative publicity and threat of legal
action (+)
• Health system managerial professional
disciplinary action (++)
• Professional ethics creates normative
pressure for improvement in quality of
care (+)
• Legal action (++)
• Building coalitions of community stakeholders and others such as
patient groups, professional associations, human rights activists,
media, and others increases political and social pressure for
improvements in MNH [32,38,40,41,46].
• Social action campaigns that combine tactics such as social
mobilization, litigation, NGO “shadow reports” to the UN Human
Rights Committees, conﬁdential inquiries, scorecards with
community participation to mount political pressure to act on
recommendations for improvements or perceived obligations of
the state of health service [33,32,38,40,41,46].
• Strengthening the capacity of activists and the media on how to
use human rights-based advocacy builds awareness of problems
and supports engagement and mobilization [33,38,41,42].
• Community participation in health facility committees are
formally and actively engaged in the accountability process and
better positioned to seek answerability at district and provincial
level [40].
• Nationally established commissions strengthen accountability to
citizens on the enforcement of laws, polices, strategies, or
commitments [41,46].
• Multisectoral independent expert review groups rule on abuse,
and track progress on MNH commitments and actions plans
providing social and political impetus for action [38,41,42,46].
• Maternal and newborn health has not received sustained
coverage as a social issue [38].
• Women rarely voice their concerns and expectations about
health services due to: the absence of procedures to express
them, to the lack of knowledge, fear of reprisals, among other
social norms limiting engagement [39].
• Feedback systems from decision-makers to community
members often are not responsive or functional [40].
• Lack of oversight mechanisms limit space for voicing
discontent or building coalitions despite the many local
associations and groups. Structures for discussion and claiming
rights are relatively absent in most contexts [39,43].
Political accountability
• Country progress and national
level monitoring
• International public shaming (+)
• Reduced donor funding for poor
performance and commitment (+)
• Negative publicity (+)
Community support and or discontent
and social reprisal for non-action (-)
• ENAP implementation in 18 high-burden countries inspired
concrete action to advance the newborn health including the in-
clusion of a newborn mortality target [14].
• Global stocktaking following international commitments related
to the Secretary General’s Global Strategy: Every Woman Every
Child and its accompanying Commission on Information and
Accountability (CoIA) was advanced with the development of
ENAP, which helped to link global and national plans,
measurement, and accountability frameworks [14].
• The ENAP implementation in countries is well-supported by UN
and multilateral and bilateral agencies resulting in new,
substantial ﬁnancial commitments [14].
• Despite additional ﬁnancial support, tracking of national
funding remains a challenge [14].
• For interventions with strong evidence, low levels of coverage
persists and health information systems require investment
and support to improve quality and quantity of data to guide
and track progress [14].
Human rights
• United Nations human
rights system
• National legal recourse
mechanisms
• Human rights-based approach
• Universal Periodic Review (UPR) calls
States to account for their international
human rights commitments and
obligations related to MNH (++)
• International public shaming (+)
• Reduced donor funding for poor
performance and commitment (+)
• Legal action (State human rights
commitments must be reﬂected in
National laws) (++)
• Negative publicity (+)
• Community support and or discontent
and social reprisal for non-action
reported in shadow reports to the
UPR (+)
• The human rights system and its reporting structures through the
UPR are a State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human
Rights Council, and provide the opportunity for each State to de-
clare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights
situations of mothers and children in their countries and to fulﬁll
their human rights obligations [43].
• The African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the African
Women’s Protocol has speciﬁc provisions on the rights of women
and girls related to maternal health and can be a powerful ac-
countability mechanism to ensure governments respect, protect,
and fulﬁll their human rights obligations related to MNH [43].
• Human rights-based processes prompt public awareness and
heighten attention to human of mothers and children [11,38,47].
• Human rights structures provide an opportunity for civil society to
hold governments to account for human rights commitments and
promises made related to MNH [11,38,43,46,47].
• Recognition of, and use of human rights commitments for social
advocacy, legal recourse (national laws should be in accord with
national human rights commitments), and political pressure have
been effective, when done strategically, to advance health issues,
particularly in the HIV domain [38,46].
• The African Court of Justice and Human Rights and the African
Women’s protocol is not yet fully implemented due to lack of
State recognition and enforcement of Human Rights standards
[43].
• The African Commission urges that maternal mortality should
be declared a state of emergency yet signiﬁcant success
cannot be achieved when African governments are not fully
engaging with the human rights system [43].
• Use of human rights and legal resources at national level
requires a functioning judiciary to uphold State laws
[11,43,46,47].
(continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
Type Accountability mechanism
and approaches
Recourse mechanisma Facilitators to effective accountability Barriers to effective accountability
Financial
accountability
Financial and budget tracking
schemes
• Global tracking
• National tracking and health
subaccounts
• International public shaming (+)
• Reduced donor funding for poor
performance and commitment (+)
• Negative publicity (+)
• Community support and or discontent
and social reprisal for nonaction (-)
• Awareness raising about actual
expenditures versus budgets leads to
social accountability (+)
• Tracking of overseas development assistance (ODA) in 150 countries
showed a positive association between ODA and mortality reduction
(though with great variation between countries) [48].
• Donor fund tracking makes it possible to hold donors to account for
their ODA expenditure [48].
• The Reproductive Health Tool of WHO is available to support
tracking of reproductive health subaccounts. [49,50].
• Budget tracking of allocations and expenditures through national
health subaccount, and speciﬁcally RMNCH subaccounts allows
ministries and civil society to track promised budget allocations and
expenditures. [49,50].
• The resource ﬂow project supported 22 countries in SSA to complete
at least one round of budget tracking using the Reproductive Health
Account tool [49].
• The process of creating subaccounts heightens interest in critically
examining the efﬁciency of allocations leading to increased use of
reproductive health expenditures [50].
• National efforts to track subaccounts require aggregated data
of higher quality, which may not be available. Including NGOs
and development partners into national health account teams
can improve data availability [49,50].
Performance-based payment
schemes
• Performance-based ﬁnancing
(PBF) (health worker/facility
level)
• Vouchers
• Payment and social recognition for
performance (++)
• Community support and or discontent
and social reprisal for nonaction (-)
• Financial and social recognition and incentives improve performance
of providers and health facility managers [51].
• Performance for payment scheme for healthcare workers improved
the quality of care, and the use of MCH services [51].
• PBF can increase the use and quality of healthcare services, stabilize or
decrease the cost of these services, support the effective use of limited
resources, and improve staff motivation, morale, and retention [67].
• Maternal health voucher programs in 28 countries showed
commonalities in design including reliance on external contracting to
private providers, or third-party management agencies, strong
community mobilization, and targeting of individuals with national
level impact [52].
• Improvements were aligned with the amount of the payment
and inversely proportionate to the amount of work required by
the health worker [67,51].
• Despite training for improvement in performance and receipt
of provider-based incentives through PBF, no evidence that
training supervision or incentives improved use of
recommended practices [67].
• It is unclear whether vouchers contribute to greater
accountability in the system beyond the set desired outcome
however [52].
a Strength of recourse mechanism:
Unknown (-): Recourse is not established; cannot be attributed to the accountability mechanism.
Soft (+): Accountability is not formal and thus not enforceable; works through accepted political, social, cultural, or professional norms to call those implicated to account for failure to act, allocate, or implement recognized obligations or duties.
Hard (++): Accountabilitymechanism includes a feedback loopwith established, approved answerability or punitive action; actors engaged are aware of obligations and consequences (usually through legal, statutory, or professional regulations).
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tions by creating public pressure on decision-makers to act on identiﬁed
problems. Using civil society stakeholders raises awareness but does
not necessarily create the desired improvements in the quality of care
as they do not link directly to consequences of inaction, or to power
structures that largely dictate whether and how change happens
[4]. Building the capacity of coalition partners including the media
(particularly through facility committees, commissions, or expert
review groups) supports accountability by better positioning stake-
holders to seek answerability. Low level of attention to MNH issues
and the economic and gender-based power structures that limit voicing
of discontent, respect for participation, and the lack of structures for
claiming rights and enforcement of established norms and rules are
also barriers to advocacy; however, some can be partly overcome
through multistakeholder approaches.
Despite the challenges, landmark documents byWHO [59], the Com-
mission on the Social Determinants of Health [60], and the World Bank
position paper on “social accountability,” or “citizen-led accountability”
all emphasize the role of social and political accountability as a key
approach to improved health, development, and governance [61]. Global
initiatives such CoIA set up tomonitor progress in implementation of the
UN Secretary General’s Global Strategy for Every Woman, Every Child
[62] (and now the Global Strategy 2.0 related to the SDGs) [63] also
clearly advocate for greater accountability through social and political
advocacy and monitoring of performance indicators [59]. In this review,
implementation of ENAP, facilitated and backed by international and
local partners, inspired action, particularly when linked to ﬁnancing for
national strategies, and accountability frameworks for programming
around the newborn. While global strategies and action plans clearly
help focus national efforts and stimulate external resources, as yet there
is insufﬁcient information to say whether such international advocacy
affectswhich intervention strategies are taken up, how they are sustained,
and their ultimate effectiveness. Similarly, human rights approaches are
heavily supported internationally through State driven processes such as
the Universal Periodic Review (of State’s Human Rights obligations).
Grounded in regional human rights institutions and protocols, they have
the potential to be effective but as yet remain aspirational because of the
lack of juridical oversight and respect for global human rights instruments
(such as international courts) [62].
Some seeﬁnancial accountability [64,65] as an achievable solution to
poor results in the health sector [62,63] as it is intrinsically a control
mechanism, especially if implemented with transparency and clear ob-
jectives [66]. For African countries, tracking of overseas development
assistance by donors adds impetus to hold high-resource countries to
account for promisesmade at Abuja and through the SDGs [48]. However,
when reﬂecting on whether greater accountability was achieved within
the healthcare system as a result of the performance-based payments
or voucher systems, evidence is mixed and hotly debated [51,67–69].
Synthesis of systematic reviews found limited evidence on whether
pay-for-performance could help to achieve theMDGs because the incen-
tive targeted patients and providers individually and thus produced only
a short-term, individually-based effect rather than a consequential
change in use of MNH services or professionalism by providers for better
quality of care.
4.1. Accountability versus political will
This review shows that accountability, whether local, national, or
international is more effective (particularly in the immediate term)
when clear expectations are backed by social and political advocacy,
and supported by incentives for positive action (e.g. performance,
ﬁnancial, social, or political recognition and reward). “Soft” recourse
threats of consequence (such as political shaming through the media,
or at the ballot box), rather than “hard” recourse measures (such as
litigation, appealing to international monitoring (e.g. the SDGs) and
arbitration bodies such as the UPR for human rights obligations [62])dominate accountability efforts to date. And, perhaps as a result, despite
decades of campaigning for safe motherhood, skilled attendance, ma-
ternal and child mortality reductions, reproductive rights, MDGs 4 and
5, and now the health-related SDGs, we remain far from changing the
conditions in which quality MNH care can be sustainably delivered in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
International tracking of State progress increased donor funding to
strong performers, but maternal and child mortality remain stubbornly
high suggesting that tracking alone has not necessarily improved
implementation [70]. Politics at national level often determine resource
allocation and there is only modest evidence that increased need or
progress translates into greater allocation of national resources for
MNH [71]. In fact, evidence of country status or what is happening
locally does not necessarily increase political will and resource allocation
due to competing priorities, or mismanagement. Ministries of health,
providers, and civil society stakeholders do not always agree on the way
forward; multiple global and regional strategies for improving progress
can add confusion and complicate rather than consolidate efforts. Health
systemweakness underlies poor performance on international indicators.
Nuanced progress and challenges are rarely captured.
4.2. Limitations
This review is limited by the use of the conventional accountability
terminology that necessarily limits the scope of the articles included.
As a result, articles that focus on formal accountability mechanisms
(such as regulations or legal recourse) may not be implemented within
a local context to change underlying factors behind the poor quality of
care. Without changing power dynamics that underscore how norms
are implemented formally or informally in the health sector, we cannot
knowwhether an effect will be seen, directly or indirectly, on the qual-
ity of MNH care and outcomes. For example, while facility-based MDRs
may identifymortality due todelays in seeking care, theymaynot,with-
out additional investigation and analysis, uncover provider attitudes
and abuse or under-the-table payments as reasons for the delay.
People-centered rather than intervention-centered accountability as
called for by the independent expert review group of CoIA will help to
broaden the deﬁnition of accountability and the change expected from
such measures.
The review was also limited by excluding nonpeer-reviewed litera-
ture. It was further limited in that articles were included that describe
accountability mechanisms without attention to the recourse process.
Many articles on accountability discuss the importance of calling duty
holders to account (in human rights terms), but do not assess the
recourse process and its effect. As a result, many articles and reports
that discuss accountability including the Lancet series on maternal,
newborn, and stillbirths,midwifery, and others, aswell as the Countdown
to 2015 and other global reviews were not included despite playing a
signiﬁcant role in how global, political accountability is commonly under-
stood and appreciated.
5. Conclusion
In a low-resource context as in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are
few accountability structures between decision-makers and those
affected by those decisions with both the power and the will to enforce
answerability. Accountability requires transparency in terms of infor-
mation on commitments and promises of decision-makers andwhether
those responsible have acted on them [72]. Performance accountability,
reinforced through social and political advocacy, and, where possible,
ﬁnancial accountability such as budget tracking, are most effective
when done collectively for common purpose.
Increasing accountability of governments at national and facility level
to ensure improvements in the quality of care by providers andmanagers
depends not only on how mechanisms are enforced, but also on how
providers and managers understand accountability. Local ideas of (and
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when they:
• worked through local actors;
• were supported by evidence and grounded in the local context;
• were locally presented, with understandable detail;
• had deﬁned aims for social and political action;
• engagedwithmultiple stakeholders, eachwith their respective area of
expertise; and
• had locally deﬁned desired outcomes.
Through the political critique of the problems, and collective agree-
ment on solutions, common cause can lead to heightened accountability
for MNH.
CoIA commitments and other global tracking of progress against
targets assume that when political will is sufﬁcient, progress is tracked
and internationally recognized, then accountability will result. However,
top-down promotion of “what works” can miss the contextual factors
that make progress in one country possible and similar interventions in
another less so. As summarized by Freedman and Schaaf [4], the assumed
relationship between tallying scores and progress, advocacy to create
voice, empowerment or, minimally, awareness and publicity on the tally
and accountability within the health system as measured through
sustained change, does not necessarily lead to improvement [4]. To
achieve improvements inMNH, greater emphasis is needed on the conse-
quences of inaction and who, ultimately, is accountable when health
systems do not deliver.
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